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MILLIKEN v. BRADLEY: BROWN'S TROUBLED
JOURNEY NORTH
THE HONORABLE NATHANIEL R. JONES*
Milliken v. Bradley representsthe impact that Brown v. Board of Education had
on Northern school In this discussion, Judge Jones describes the social changes
that led to the Detroitschool case and the plaintiffs'path up and down the judicialsystem to ultimate desegregation of Detroit schools.

rWHE focus of my remarks is the case of Milliken v. Bradley.' In focusL ing on this case, we analyze the problems of applying Brown v. Board
of Education' to the North, particularly in states where the Constitution
and the statutes disfavored segregation.
To many, the Brown decision only impacted the eleven states of the old
Confederacy and the District of Columbia. The popular notion was that
it did not apply to the North. But, unlike Brown in the South, Milliken I
and 11 is a case that did not arise out of a grand strategy to attack segregation in the North. It more or less evolved. It evolved out of the frustrations and the disappointments of Black parents in Detroit. They were
troubled by the quality of education that was being offered to their children-or, more precisely, the miseducation to which their children were
being exposed-and the halting, tentative steps that were being taken by
school officials to address their concerns.
It was certainly true that segregation in the North at that time was
galloping. In virtually every major metropolitan area, racial isolation
and racially identifiable schools were increasing. But eliminating the
problem of segregation was not the priority demand of Black parents;
their primary concern was education.
It was not until the school district took steps to reassign a few of the
students for educational purposes that the "fur began to fly" and that the
political resistance from Whites began to mount. The reassignment had
a desegregative effect which resulted in the assignment of White students,
for the first time, to previously all-Black or racially identifiable Black
schools. That reassignment made it clear to persons who had not
thought much about the idea that race and inferior education were twins,
and that both race and inferior education had to be addressed simultaneously. The resistance did not become fierce until the status quo was disturbed and White students were going to be placed in the inferior schools
to which Black children were already assigned.
Thus comes Milliken v. Bradley. The case reached the U.S. Supreme
* A.B., Youngstown State University; J.D., Youngstown State University. Judge,
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
1. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II); Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I).
2. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown 11); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
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Court in 1974.3 The majority decision, a five-to-four ruling, ranks as an
instance in which the United States Supreme Court suffered a failure of
courage. In handing down its decision, the majority was guilty of the
indictment rendered by the dissenting Justices-Justice Marshall, Justice
Douglas, Justice White, and Justice Brennan.4
That majority decision was clearly a watershed. It was a result-oriented decision that rejected the wealth of evidence convincingly demonstrating, at least to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sitting en
bane,5 that the State of Michigan and the Detroit school board, operating
in lockstep, had deliberately created and perpetuated public school segregation on a massive scale. It was, in part, the massiveness of the permitted constitutional wrong that caused the Court majority to so grossly
distort the evidentiary record and shirk its responsibility.
It is futile for legal scholars to continue to try to make sense out of the
majority holding without taking into account that the Court departed
from precedent and avoided logic and reason. To harness or to limit the
remedial power of the district court, after it had already found violations
of the Constitution, was simply to elevate political concerns over those of
the Constitution.
Prior cases had directed that, once a constitutional violation was
found, all-out desegregation was required. The reigning cases instructed
that, where a constitutional violation was found, the segregation should
be eliminated root and branch.
The majority in Milliken I, in an opinion authored by the Chief Justice, took the Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education6 doctrine on remedy, that held the nature of a racial violation determines the
scope of the desegregation remedy, and gave it a twist. Rather than deal
with the all-out mandate to eliminate segregation that the Supreme Court
had required in prior cases, the district courts were then virtually required to first apply a micrometer to any proposed remedy to ensure that
not one whit too much desegregation would occur.
Let me review rather quickly what had been happening in Detroit and
describe briefly the finding of the district court as affirmed by an en bane
court of appeals. I earlier noted that some had contended that Brown "
had no meaning in the North because the extent to which children were
racially segregated was mere happenstance. It was the fortuity of this
segregation, it was said, that should excuse Northern school districts
from constitutional scrutiny.
In the cases of Bell v. School City of Gary' and Deal v. Cincinnati
3.
4.
5.
(1974).
6.
7.

418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken 1).
Id. at 782.
Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 242 (1973) (en banc) rev'd, 418 U.S. 717
402 U.S. 1 (1971).
349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown 11); 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).

8. 324 F.2d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
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Board of Education,9 the courts held that segregation was de facto and,
therefore, the federal courts were without jurisdiction to impose desegregation remedies. However, the Milliken " case, as had Davis v. School
District1 (a case decided by Judge Damon Keith), Berry v. School District, 2 and the Keyes v. School District No. 1 13 case in Denver, demonstrated that by digging beneath the veneer it was possible to show that
the causation was not necessarily benign.
After the Sixth Circuit struck down Michigan Act 4814 on grounds of
nullification and interposition, the district court's discovery process developed extensive evidence. Policies and practices, actions and inactions,
had combined to establish identifiable one-race schools. 15
The trial judge, Stephen Roth, with the benefit of a vast array of evidence, drew a compelling picture in his opinion. He identified the various segregative devices, and their effects, engaged in by all levels of
government and the private sector. They led to, among other things, the
creation of segregated housing patterns on top of which school officials
imposed a neighborhood attendance policy with the foreseeable consequence of segregated schools. 6 Judge Roth found that the Detroit
board, exercising powers delegated to it by the state, had utilized attendance boundary changes, optional attendance zones, transportation from
overcrowded schools, grade structure, building site selection and construction policies, to segregate children. 7 The Court further held that
the state had caused segregation in a significant way. Through the enactment of Act 48, the state had imposed lower bonds on Detroit than on
other districts. The state had also refused transportation assistance to
Detroit. All of these actions added up to de jure segregation. The Sixth
Circuit agreed and further concluded that a remedy for these violations
which was limited to the political boundaries of Detroit would not
suffice.'
In their brief to the United States Supreme Court, the plaintiffs directly addressed the reality faced by Judge Roth: Detroit's core of 133
virtually all-Black schools, containing over 130,000 students, was surrounded by virtually all-White school districts. While prior cases had
held that, when dealing with a single district, courts could exercise their
9. 369 F.2d 55, 64 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967).
10. 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II); 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I).
11. 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971).
12. 505 F.2d 238 (6th Cir. 1974).
13. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
14. See Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897, 904 (6th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717
(1974). This statute interfered with the Detroit Board of Education's plan to reassign
White students into Black schools.
15. See Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 587 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 484 F.2d
215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
16. See id.
17. See id at 588.
18. See Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 249-50 (6th Cir. 1973) (en banc), rey'd, 418
U.S. 717 (1974).
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equitable powers to eliminate segregation and were free to reassign students without regard to attendance boundaries within those districts,' 9
the boundary lines between Detroit and the other districts in the metropolitan area were drawn by the state-a state that had been adjudged a
wrongdoer. As a result, Judge Roth concluded that those boundaries
were neither impermeable nor unbreachable and, thus, should no longer
constrain the children of Detroit in a segregated manner. 20
After identifying the segregative acts of Michigan and Detroit in their
brief to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs attempted to justify Judge
Roth's decision to extend the remedy across the city boundaries:
If that boundary line was permitted to stand without breach to perpetuate the basic dual structure, the intentional confinement of Black children in schools separate from whites will continue for the foreseeable
future, the violation of constitutional rights will continue without remedy. Such
a result would repeal Brown and return these children to
2
Plessy. 1
Yet, that is exactly what the Supreme Court majority did. No one was
more prophetic than Justice Marshall in his dissent, and his words bear
repeating because they continue to resonate all across this country:
Today's holding, I fear, is more a reflection of a perceived public mood
that we have gone far enough in enforcing the Constitution's guarantee
of equal justice than it is a product of neutral principles of law. In the
short run, it may seem to be the easier course to allow our great metropolitan areas to be divided up each into two cities one white, the other
22
black-but it is a course, I predict, our people will ultimately regret.
In short, the Supreme Court's analysis and holding in this case whipsawed the plaintiffs' case by contorting the recorded evidence. At the
district court trial, the plaintiffs had offered substantial proof of the housing discrimination in the Greater Detroit Area and its effect on school
segregation. They demonstrated that a school attendance policy based
upon segregated neighborhood schools would foreseeably create a segregated school system. Thus, they firmly linked housing segregation with
school segregation.23 But, while the court of appeals affirmed Judge
Roth's opinion on causation with respect to housing and the system be19. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Monroe v.
Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968); Davis v. School Dist., 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Ed., 372 F.2d
836 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967) (en banc).
20. See Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 593-94 (E.D. Mich. 1971) aff'd, 484
F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
21. Paul Dimond, Beyond Busing, Inside the Challenge to Urban Segregation 101
(1985).
22. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 814-15 (1974) (Milliken 1) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
23. See Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. at 587-88.
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ing segregated,2 4 it nevertheless felt compelled to state in its en bane
opinion that it was not relying upon the proof of housing
discrimination.2 5
Upon considering the court of appeals' opinion, the Supreme Court
rejected the inter-district reach because there was no inter-district violation with an inter-district effect.26 Thus, in concluding that there was no
constitutional wrong calling for an inter-district remedy, the Supreme
Court struck down the Sixth Circuit's affirmance of Judge Roth's
decision.2 7
The most curious aspect of this exercise, however, was the rationale of
the swing Justice, Potter Stewart, who, unlike the Chief Justice who had
authored the majority opinion, would have held for the plaintiffs if they
had shown that state officials had used housing or zoning laws in a purposefully racially discriminatory fashion.28 But there was proof in the
record, abundant proof in the record, of purposeful and racially discriminatory housing. Nevertheless, because the court of appeals said it was
not relying upon it in affirming Judge Roth, the Supreme Court did not
see fit to go back to the record itself and premise an affirmance upon that
housing proof. To hold that there was no proof was one thing; to conclude that the court of appeals did not see fit to rely upon it was quite
another. That is one of the sad ironies of the Milliken case.
So, it was remanded to the district court for implementation of a remedy limited to Detroit. By this time, a new judge had been assigned to
the case because of the death of Judge Roth. The judge to whom it was
assigned, Robert DeMascio, appointed experts, and out of all that came a
plan that included substantial educational components.2 9 The state was
ordered to contribute to the cost of these educational components. The
state resisted and appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals which
upheld the district court.30 The matter then went to the Supreme Court
and, following
briefing and argument, the court of appeals was
31
affirmed.
What was significant about its affirmance, in what we call Milliken II,
was the principle that a remedy could be justified, and a state required to
pay even when the remedy went beyond mere pupil reassignment. 32 The
essence of the Milliken 11 decision was that, to the extent that a district
court finds these educational components are necessary to eliminate seg24. See Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 242 (6th Cir. 1973) (en banc), rey'd, 418
U.S. 717 (1974).

25. See id. at 264.
26. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (Miliken 1).
27. See id. at 752-53.
28. See id. at 755 (Steward, J., concurring).
29. See Bradley v. Milliken, 411 F. Supp. 943, 944-45 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd in
part and remanded in part, 540 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
30. Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
31. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II).
32. See id. at 287-88.
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regation-or if not to eliminate segregation, to minimize the effects of
segregation-in a district which is overwhelmingly Black, that aspect of
the remedial plan will be affirmed.
In conclusion, let me just note that it is interesting how we have come
full circle. I noted at the beginning that this case did not arise out of a
primary demand by the Black parents to challenge segregation; it arose
because of concern over the quality of the educational offerings to which
their children were subjected. We reached the point where the Supreme
Court was directing the State of Michigan to do by court order what it
refused to do as a matter of educational policy, and that was provide
resources for the advancement of the educational quality of minority
children.
A final irony-I guess I can call it an irony-is that the principle that
is embodied in Milliken 11 is back before the U.S. Supreme Court in
United States v. Fordice,33 a case out of Mississippi involving the question
of the unitariness of the institutions of higher education in Mississippi.
The question is whether the state has done enough to eliminate segregation in higher education when it continues to have significant numbers of
one-race colleges and junior colleges in the State of Mississippi.
The majority opinion of the Fifth Circuit in upholding the position of
the University of Mississippi, or the Mississippi higher educational authority, is that they have achieved unitary status. Judge Patrick Higginbotham's dissenting view is that they had not achieved unitary status
because there are too many facets of the educational program in Mississippi that remain one-race and remain segregated. It will be interesting
to see how the Supreme Court treats the holding in Milliken II in the
context of these higher education cases.
I think that our jurisprudence would have been quite different if in
Milliken I the Court had simply said, "There is a violation, and it is this
violation of an expanding core of Black schools and neighborhoods always encircled by a receding ring of White schools. We do not know the
extent of it, we do not know what the remedy is, but there is no question
that that is a violation of the principles established in Brown." What if
that is all the Court had done; how would we be different today?
In the first place, I think it would have resulted in a remand to the
district court for it to exercise its flexible and equitable powers. The
Chancellor has been known to do this in the past and it is the inherent
nature of the Chancellor to act equitably in dealing with these intractable
problems. Were the court not faced with an absolute prohibition against
inter-district assignment, or constraints so severe that an effective remedy
becomes prohibitive, schools and courts would be able to deal with segregated education.
I think the landscape of American public education would be totally
different today if the Supreme Court had gone so far as to leave the reso33. 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
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lution to the various district courts. They would have the familiarity
with the local problems and could take testimony to decide the most
effective way of dealing with each fact or situation that it confronted.
I can think of any number of cases where it would be different. We
need only take the Cleveland case that was decided after Detroit, or the
Columbus or Dayton cases that Paul Dimond argued in the Supreme
Court. Had they been approached on a metropolitan or inter-district basis, and if the district court had been free to approach the problem of
remedy without being hemmed in by these artificial political boundaries,
then I think that the problems of urban education in those particular
districts would be totally different from what they are today.
As it stands now, those systems have virtually resegregated. Dayton
has resegregated and the Court has terminated jurisdiction. In Columbus, the Court has likewise terminated jurisdiction and that system is
now resegregating by reverting to the neighborhood schools. Resegregation is on the move. If the Milliken decision had gone the other way, I
think desegregation would still be the order of the day and our metropolitan areas would be moving toward the goal of a single society.

